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Abstract: The present paper deals with the distinction between the models of the managed and 
entrepreneurial economies. It explains why the model of the entrepreneurial economy may be a 
better frame of reference than the model of the managed economy in the contemporary, developed 
economies. This is done by contrasting the most fundamental elements of the managed economy 
model with those of the entrepreneurial economy model. Building upon Audretsch and Thurik 
(2000 and 2001), Audretsch, Thurik, Verheul and Wennekers (2002) and Thurik and Verheul 
(2003), fourteen dimensions are identified as the basis for comparing models of the entrepreneurial 
and the managed economy. 
Introduction 
Robert Solow (1956) was awarded a Nobel Prize for identifying the sources of growth – the 
factors of capital and labor. These were factors best utilized in large scale production. Throughout 
the first three-quarters of the last century, the increasing level of transaction costs (Coase, 1937) 
incurred in large-scale production dictated increasing firm size over time. Certainly, statistical 
evidence points towards an increasing presence and role of large enterprises in the economy in this 
period (Caves, 1982; Teece, 1993; Brock and Evans, 1989). This development towards large-scale 
activity was visible, not just in one country, but in most of the OECD countries. In this same period, 
the importance of entrepreneurship and small business seemed to be fading. Although it was 
recognized that the small business sector was in need of protection for both social and political 
reasons, there were few that made this case on the grounds of economic efficiency. 
Romer (1986), Lucas (1988 and 1993) and Krugman (1991) discovered that the traditional 
production factors of labor and capital are not sufficient in explaining growth and that knowledge 
instead has become the vital factor in endogenous growth models. Knowledge has typically been 
measured in terms of R&D, human capital and patented inventions (Audretsch and Thurik, 2000 
and 2001). Many scholars have predicted that the emergence of knowledge as an important 
determinant of growth and competitiveness in global markets would render new and small firms 
even more futile. Conventional wisdom would have predicted increased globalization to present an 
even more hostile environment to small business (Vernon, 1970). Caves argued that the additional 
costs of knowledge activity that would be incurred by small businesses in a global economy 
“constitute an important reason for expecting that foreign investment will be mainly an activity of 
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large firms” (Caves, 1982, p. 53). As Chandler (1990, p. 78) concluded: “to compete globally you 
have to be big”. Furthermore, Gomes-Casseres (1997, p. 33) observed that “students of 
international business have traditionally believed that success in foreign markets required large 
size”. In a world that became dominated by exporting giant firms, global markets, global products, 
global players became the focus of interest. Small firms were thought to be at a disadvantage vis-à-
vis larger firms because of the fixed costs of learning about foreign environments, communicating 
at long distances, and negotiating with national governments. 
Despite these counteracting forces, entrepreneurship has emerged as the engine of economic 
and social development throughout the world.1 The role of entrepreneurship has changed 
dramatically, fundamentally shifting between what Audretsch and Thurik (2001) introduced as the 
model of the managed economy and that of the entrepreneurial economy. In particular, Audretsch 
and Thurik (2001) argue that the model of the managed economy is the political, social and 
economic response to an economy dictated by the forces of large-scale production, reflecting the 
predominance of the production factors of capital and (unskilled) labor as the sources of 
competitive advantage. By contrast, the model of the entrepreneurial economy is the political, social 
and economic response to an economy dictated not just by the dominance of the production factor 
of knowledge – which Romer (1990, 1994) and Lucas (1988) identified as replacing the more 
traditional factors as the source of competitive advantage – but also by a very different, but 
complementary, factor they had overlooked: entrepreneurship capital, or the capacity to engage in 
and generate entrepreneurial activity. It is not straightforward that knowledge or R&D always spills 
over due to its mere existence (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2003). 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the distinction between the models of the managed 
and entrepreneurial economies and to explain why the model of the entrepreneurial economy may 
be a better frame of reference than the model of the managed economy when explaining the role of 
entrepreneurship in the contemporary, developed economies. This is done by contrasting the most 
fundamental elements of the managed economy model with those of the entrepreneurial economy 
model. Building upon Audretsch and Thurik (2000 and 2001), Audretsch, Thurik, Verheul and 
Wennekers (2002) and Thurik and Verheul (2003), fourteen dimensions are identified as the basis 
for comparing models of the entrepreneurial and the managed economy. The common thread 
throughout these dimensions is the more important role of new and small enterprises in the 
entrepreneurial economy model (as compared to that of the managed economy). Understanding the 
distinction between the models of the entrepreneurial and managed economies is vital for 
entrepreneurship education explaining why the causes and consequences of entrepreneurship differ 
in the managed and the entrepreneurial economies (Wennekers, Uhlaner and Thurik, 2002; Thurik, 
Wennekers and Uhlaner, 2002). This suggests that the conditions for, and aspects of, teaching 
entrepreneurship under the model of the entrepreneurial economy may not be the same as under the 
managed economy model. While the paradigm prevalent across the management curricula was a 
response to managing production in the managed economy model, the model of the entrepreneurial 
economy dictates new approaches. 
The Era of the Managed Economy 
Throughout the first three-quarters of the last century large enterprise was clearly the 
dominant form of business organization (Schumpeter, 1934). The systematic empirical evidence, 
gathered from both Europe and North America, documented a sharp decreased in the role of small 
business in the post-war period. This was the era of mass production when economies of scale 
seemed to be the decisive factor in dictating efficiency. This was the world described by John 
Kenneth Galbraith (1956) in his theory of countervailing power, where the power of ‘big business’ 
was balanced by that of ‘big labor’ and ‘big government’. This was the era of the man in the gray 
flannel suit and the organization man, when virtually every major social and economic institution 
                                                          
1 See Carree and Thurik (2003) for a literature survey spanning different strands. 
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acted to reinforce the stability and predictability needed for mass production (Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Chandler, 1977).2 Stability, continuity and homogeneity were the cornerstones of the 
managed economy (Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). Large firms dominated this economy. Large 
corporations in the managed economy are described in The Economist (December 22nd, 2001, p. 
76): “They were hierarchical and bureaucratic organizations that where in the business of making 
long runs of standardized products. They introduced new and improved varieties with predictable 
regularity; they provided workers with life-time employment; and enjoyed fairly good relations with 
the giant trade unions”. In organization studies this modernism is referred to as Fordism.3 
Small firms and entrepreneurship were viewed as a luxury, as something Western countries 
needed to ensure a decentralization of decision making, obtained only at the cost of efficiency. A 
generation of scholars, spanning a broad spectrum of academic fields and disciplines, has sought to 
create insight into the issues surrounding this perceived trade-off between economic efficiency on 
the one hand and political and economic decentralization on the other (Williamson, 1968). These 
scholars have produced a large number of studies focusing mainly on three questions: (i) What are 
the gains to size and large-scale production?, (ii) What are the economic and welfare implications of 
an oligopolistic market structure, i.e., is economic performance promoted or reduced in an industry 
with just a handful of large-scale firms?, and (iii) Given the overwhelming evidence that large-scale 
production and economic concentration is associated with increased efficiency, what are the public 
policy implications? 
This literature has produced a series of stylized facts about the role of small business in the 
post-war economies of North America and Western Europe: 
• Small businesses were generally less efficient than their larger counterparts. Studies from 
the United States in the 1960s and 1970s revealed that small businesses produced at lower 
levels of efficiency than larger firms (Weiss, 1966, 1964 and Pratten, 1971).  
• Small businesses were characterized by lower levels of employee compensation. Empirical 
evidence from both North America and Europe found a systematic and positive relationship 
between employee compensation and firm size (Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, 1990; Brown 
and Medoff, 1989). 
• Small businesses were only marginally involved in innovative activity. Based on R&D 
measures, small businesses accounted for only a small amount of innovative activity 
(Chandler, 1990; Scherer, 1991; Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Audretsch, 1995). 
• The relative importance of small businesses was declining over time in both North America 
and Europe (Scherer, 1991). 
The Emergence of the Entrepreneurial Economy 
Given the painstaking and careful documentation that large-scale production was driving out 
entrepreneurship, it was particularly startling and seemingly paradoxical when scholars first began 
to document that – what had seemed like – the inevitable demise of small business, began to reverse 
itself from the 1970s onwards. Loveman and Sengenberger (1991) and Acs and Audretsch (1993) 
carried out systematic international analyses examining the re-emergence of small business and 
entrepreneurship in North America and Europe. Two major findings emerged from these studies. 
First, the relative importance of small business varies largely across countries, and, secondly, in 
most European countries and North America the importance of small business increased since the 
mid-1970s. In the United States the average real GDP per firm increased by nearly two-thirds 
between 1947 and 1989 – from $150,000 to $245,000 – reflecting a trend towards larger enterprises 
                                                          
2 See Whyte (1960) and Riesman (1950) for a description of the gray flannel suit and the organization man. 
3 Early contributions of organization studies have shown that changes in the external organization affect the type of 
organization that is successful. For instance, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) show that the more homogeneous and stable 
the environment, the more formalized and hierarchical the organization. 
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and a decreasing importance of small firms. However, within the subsequent seven years it had 
fallen by about 14 percent to $210,000, reflecting a sharp reversal of this trend and the re-
emergence of small business (Brock and Evans, 1989). Similarly, small firms accounted for one-
fifth of manufacturing sales in the United States in 1976, but by 1986 the sales share of small firms 
had risen to over one-quarter (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). 
The reversal of the trend away from large enterprises towards the re-emergence of small 
business was not limited to North America. It was also seen in Europe. For example, in the 
Netherlands the business ownership rate (business owners per workforce) fell during the post-war 
period, until it reached the lowest point at 8.1 percent in 1984 (Verheul et al., 2002). The downward 
trend was subsequently reversed, and a business ownership rate of 10.4 percent was reached by 
1998 (Verheul et al., 2002). Similarly, the employment share in manufacturing of small firms in the 
Netherlands increased from 68.3 percent in 1978 to 71.8 percent in 1986. In the United Kingdom 
this share increased from 30.1 percent in 1979 to 39.9 percent in 1986; in (Western) Germany from 
54.8 percent in 1970 to 57.9 percent by 1987; in Portugal from 68.3 percent in 1982 to 71.8 percent 
in 1986; in the North of Italy from 44.3 percent in 1981 to 55.2 percent in 1987, and in the South of 
Italy from 61.4 percent in 1981 to 68.4 percent in 1987 (Acs and Audretsch, 1993). A study of EIM 
(2002) documents how the relative importance of small firms in Europe (19 countries), measured in 
terms of employment shares, has continued to increase between 1988 and 2001. See Figure 1 for the 
development of the entrepreneurship rates (=business ownership rates) in a selection of countries 
taken from van Stel (2003). A distinct U-shape can be observed for these countries. The upward 
trend of the entrepreneurship rate is leveling off in such countries as the UK and the US.4 In the UK 
this may be due to policy measures favoring incumbent growth businesses rather than startups 
(Thurik, 2003). In the US this may be due to the high level of economic development and to shake 
out of industries that are in a more advanced stage than elsewhere in the area of modern OECD 
countries.5 
Figure 1: Entrepreneurship rates (business owners per workforce) in six OECD 
countries 
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4 See van Stel (2003) or Verheul et al. (2002) for precise data and figures of the US development. 
5 See also Kwoka and White (2001) who observe that despite its importance in absolute and relative terms the small 
business sector accounts for a diminishing share of US private sector activity. In van Stel (2003) it can be observed that 
the entrepreneurship rate in countries like Japan and France has dropped over a long period including the 1990s. 
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As the empirical evidence documenting the re-emergence of entrepreneurship increased, 
scholars began to look for explanations and to develop a theoretical basis. Early explanations 
(Brock and Evans, 1989) revolved around six hypotheses regarding the increased role of small 
firms: 
• Technological change reduces the importance of scale economies in manufacturing.6 
• Increased globalization and the accompanying competition from a greater number of foreign 
rivals render markets more volatile.  
• The changing composition of the labor force, towards a greater participation of women, 
immigrants, young and old workers, is more conducive to smaller than larger enterprises, 
due to the greater premium placed on work flexibility. 
• A proliferation of consumer demand away from standardized and mass-produced goods 
towards tailor-made and personalized products facilitates small producers serving niche 
markets. 
• Deregulation and privatization facilitate the entry of new and small firms into markets 
previously protected and inaccessible. 
• The increased importance of innovation in high-wage countries reduces the relative 
importance of large-scale production, fostering entrepreneurial activity instead. 
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) explain the re-emergence of entrepreneurship in Europe and 
North America on the basis of increased globalization, which has shifted the comparative advantage 
towards knowledge-based economic activity. They discuss the consequences for economic 
performance: entrepreneurship capital may be a missing link in explaining variations in economic 
performance (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2003). An alternative and wider view of this missing link 
may be that it is the institutional fabric that makes the difference between high and low 
performance. For example, Saxenian (1994) attributes the superior performance of Silicon Valley to 
a high capacity for promoting entrepreneurship. While the traditional production factors of labor 
and capital, as well as knowledge capital, are important in shaping output, the capacity to harness 
new ideas by creating new enterprises is also essential to economic output. 
While entrepreneurs undertake a definitive action, i.e., they start a new business, this action 
can not be viewed in a vacuum devoid of context. Rather, as Audretsch et al. (2002) show, 
entrepreneurship is shaped by a number of forces and factors, including legal and institutional as 
well as social factors. The study of social capital and its impact on economic decision making and 
behavior dates back to classic economics and sociology literature where it is argued that social and 
relational structures influence market processes (Granovetter, 1985). Thorton and Flynne (2003) 
and Saxenian (1994) argue that entrepreneurial environments are characterized by thriving 
supportive networks that provide the institutional fabric linking individual entrepreneurs to 
organized sources of learning and resources. Studying networks located in California’s Silicon 
Valley, Saxenian (1990, p. 96/7) emphasizes that it is the communication between individuals that 
facilitates the transmission of knowledge across agents, firms, and industries, and not just a high 
endowment of human capital and knowledge in the region: “It is not simply the concentration of 
skilled labor, suppliers and information that distinguish the region. A variety of regional 
institutions – including Stanford University, several trade associations and local business 
organizations, and a myriad of specialized consulting, market research, public relations and 
venture capital firms – provide technical, financial, and networking services which the region’s 
enterprises often cannot afford individually. These networks defy sectoral barriers: individuals 
move easily from semiconductor to disk drive firms or from computer to network makers. They 
move from established firms to startups (or vice versa) and even to market research or consulting 
                                                          
6 The influence of technological change on the shaping of business conditions has been widely discussed elsewhere in 
the late 1980s. See Piori and Sable (1984) and Tushman and Anderson (1986). 
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firms, and from consulting firms back into startups. And they continue to meet at trade shows, 
industry conferences, and the scores of seminars, talks, and social activities organized by local 
business organizations and trade associations. In these forums, relationships are easily formed and 
maintained, technical and market information is exchanged, business contacts are established, and 
new enterprises are conceived…This decentralized and fluid environment also promotes the 
diffusion of intangible technological capabilities and understandings”. 
Such contexts generating a high propensity for economic agents to start new firms can be 
characterized as being rich in entrepreneurship capital. Other contexts, where the startup of new 
firms is inhibited, can be characterized as being weak in entrepreneurship capital.7 
Entrepreneurship capital exerts a positive impact on competitiveness and growth in a 
number of ways. The first way is by creating knowledge spillovers. Romer (1986), Lucas (1988 and 
1993) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) established that knowledge spillovers are an important 
mechanism underlying endogenous growth. However, they shed little light on the actual 
mechanisms by which knowledge is transmitted across firms and individuals. Insight into the 
process of knowledge diffusion is important, especially since a policy implication commonly drawn 
from new economic growth theory is that, due to the increasing role of knowledge and the resulting 
increasing returns, knowledge factors (e.g., R&D) should be publicly supported. It is important to 
recognize that also the mechanisms for spillovers may play a key role and, accordingly, should 
serve as a focus for public policy enhancing economic growth and development.8 
The literature identifying mechanisms creating knowledge spillovers is sparse and remains 
underdeveloped. However, entrepreneurship is an important area where transmission mechanisms 
have been identified.9 This will be explained below.  
Cohen and Levinthal (1989) suggest that firms develop the capacity to adapt new technology 
and ideas developed in other firms and are therefore able to appropriate some of the returns 
accruing to investments in new knowledge made externally (i.e., outside the own organization). 
This view of spillovers is consistent with the traditional knowledge production function, where 
firms exist exogenously, and then make (knowledge) investments to generate innovative output. 
Audretsch (1995) proposes a shift in the unit of observation away from exogenously assumed firms 
towards individuals, such as scientists, engineers or other knowledge workers, i.e., agents with 
endowments of new economic knowledge. When the focus is shifted from the firm to the individual 
as the relevant unit of observation, the appropriability issue remains, but the question becomes: 
How can economic agents with a given endowment of new knowledge best appropriate the returns 
from that knowledge? Albert O. Hirschman (1970) argues that if voice proves to be ineffective 
within incumbent organizations, and loyalty is sufficiently weak, a knowledge worker may exit the 
firm or university where the knowledge is created in order to create a new company. In this 
spillover process the knowledge production function is reversed. Knowledge is exogenous and 
embodied in a worker and the firm is created endogenously through the worker’s effort to 
appropriate the value of his knowledge by way of innovative activity. Hence, entrepreneurship 
serves as a mechanism by which knowledge spills over from the source to a new firm in which it is 
commercialized. There is a large history of people who only started their firms after large firms 
were disinterested in the innovation. This applies particularly to competence-destroying industries. 
Chester Carlsson started Xerox after his proposal to produce a new copy machine was rejected by 
Kodak. Steven Jobs started his Apple Computer after his proposal to produce a new personal 
computer was turned down by Xerox. 
                                                          
7 While this may seem like a tautology, we are using the concept of entrepreneurial capital to characterize locations 
exhibiting a high degree of entrepreneurial capital. 
8 For instance, see Scarpetta et al. (2002) where a firm-level database for ten OECD countries is used to present 
empirical evidence on the role that policy measures and institutions in product and labor markets play for firm dynamics 
and productivity. Moreover, different features of entrant and exiting firms across countries are observed. 
9 As Audretsch and Feldman (1996) point out knowledge spillovers occur in the context of networks and clusters. 
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A second way in which entrepreneurship capital generates economic growth is through 
augmenting the number of enterprises and increasing competition. Jacobs (1969) and Porter (1990) 
argue that competition is more conducive to knowledge externalities than is local monopoly.10 With 
local competition Jacobs (1969) is not referring to competition within product markets as has 
traditionally been envisioned within the industrial organization literature, but rather to the 
competition for new ideas embodied in economic agents. Not only does an increase in the number 
of firms enhance the competition for new ideas, but greater competition across firms also facilitates 
the entry of new firms specializing in a particular new product niche. This is because the necessary 
complementary inputs are more likely to be available from small specialist niche firms than from 
large, vertically integrated producers. Feldman and Audretsch (1999) as well as Glaeser et al. 
(1992) found empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that an increase in competition in a city, 
as measured by the number of enterprises, is accompanied by higher growth performance of that 
city.11  
A third way in which entrepreneurship capital generates economic output is by providing 
diversity among firms (Cohen and Klepper, 1992). Not only does entrepreneurship capital generate 
a greater number of enterprises, it also increases the variety of enterprises in a certain location. A 
key assumption of Hannan and Freeman (1989) in the population ecology literature is that each new 
organization represents a unique formula.12 There has been a series of theoretical arguments 
suggesting that the degree of diversity, as opposed to homogeneity, will influence the growth 
potential of a location.  
The theoretical basis for linking diversity to economic performance is provided by Jacobs 
(1969), who argues that the most important sources of knowledge spillovers are external to the 
industry in which the firm operates and that cities are a source of considerable innovation because 
here the diversity of knowledge sources is greatest (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Jaffe et al., 
1993). According to Jacobs (1969) it is the exchange of complementary knowledge across diverse 
firms and economic agents that yields an important return on new economic knowledge. Jacobs 
(1969) develops a theory emphasizing the argument that the variety of industries within a 
geographic environment promotes knowledge externalities and, ultimately, innovative activity and 
economic growth. In this environment entrepreneurship capital can contribute to growth and 
development by injecting diversity and serving as a conduit for knowledge spillovers, leading to 
increased competition. The entrepreneurial economy is characterized by a high reliance on this third 
role of entrepreneurship capital.13  
Contrasting the Entrepreneurial and Managed Economy Models 
The era of the managed economy is being supplanted by the emergence of the 
entrepreneurial economy. This suggests two contrasting models with a differing role of 
entrepreneurship. The model of the managed economy revolves around the links between stability, 
specialization, homogeneity, scale, certainty and predictability on the one hand and economic 
growth on the other. By contrast, the model of the entrepreneurial economy focuses on the links 
between flexibility, turbulence, diversity, novelty, innovation, linkages and clustering on the one 
hand and economic growth on the other. The models of the managed and the entrepreneurial 
economy can be compared distinguishing between different groups of characteristics, including 
underlying forces, external environment characteristics, internal or firm characteristics and policy 
characteristics. See Table 1 at the end of the present article. 
                                                          
10 An anonymous referee pointed out that saying that competition is more conducive to knowledge externalities than a 
local monopoly is not the same as that new firms create more knowledge externalities. 
11 See also Acs (2002) who hints at the dual causality between the growth of cities and that of the number of firms. 
12 As opposed to the organizational ecology approach of Hannan and Freeman institutional theorists in organization 
studies also point to strong pressures on new firms to conform (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). 
13 A different view on the role of knowledge and its spillovers is offered in the “systems of innovations” approach 
(Nelson, 1993). 
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Underlying forces 
The first group of characteristics contrasts the forces underlying the models of the 
entrepreneurial and managed economy: localization versus globalization; change versus continuity; 
and jobs and high wages versus jobs or high wages. 
In the model of the managed economy production results from the inputs of labor and capital 
(Solow, 1956). Geography provides a platform to combine (mobile) capital with (immobile) lower-
cost labor (Kindleberger and Audretsch, 1983). In the model of the entrepreneurial economy 
knowledge is the dominant factor of production. The comparative advantage in the knowledge 
economy is dependent on innovative activity. Knowledge spillovers are an important source of this 
innovative activity. Hence, in the model of the entrepreneurial economy local proximity is 
important, with the region being the most important locus of economic activity, as knowledge tends 
to be developed in the context of localized production networks embedded in innovative clusters.  
While the model of the managed economy focuses more on continuity (Chandler, 1977), the 
model of the entrepreneurial economy provokes and thrives on change. Although innovation is 
present under the conditions of both change and continuity, the locus of innovative activity differs. 
A distinction can be made between incremental and radical innovations. Innovations are considered 
incremental when they are compatible with the core competence and technological trajectory of the 
firm (Teece, Rumult, Dosi and Winter, 1994). By contrast, a radical innovation can be defined as 
extending beyond the boundaries of the core competence and technological trajectory of the firm. In 
the model of the managed economy change is absorbed within a given technological paradigm: the 
average firm excels at incremental innovation. By contrast, in the model of the entrepreneurial 
economy, the capacity to break out of the technological lock-in imposed by existing paradigms is 
enhanced by the ability of economic agents to start new firms. Thus, incremental innovative activity 
along with diffusion plays a more important role in the model of the managed economy. While 
often requiring large investments in R&D, this type of innovative activity generates incremental 
changes in products along the existing technological trajectories. In the entrepreneurial economy 
model, the comparative advantage of the high-cost location demands innovative activity earlier in 
the product life cycle and which is of a more radical nature.  
One of the most striking policy dilemmas in the model of the managed economy is that 
unemployment can be reduced only at the cost of lower wages. In the model of the entrepreneurial 
economy high employment can be combined with high wages and a low wage level does not imply 
high employment.14 An indication of the absence of a trade-off between high wages and 
employment is the fact that although corporate downsizing has been rampant throughout the OECD 
countries, there is a large variance in unemployment rates. Audretsch et al. (2002) show that 
economies of OECD countries exhibiting characteristics in conformity with the entrepreneurial 
economy model have been more successful at creating new jobs to compensate for jobs lost in the 
process of corporate downsizing. Small firms in general, and new ventures in particular, are the 
engine of employment creation.15 Under the model of the managed economy the job creation by 
small firms is associated with lower wages. However, the growth of new firms may not only 
generate greater employment, but also higher wages. New firm growth ensures that higher 
employment does not come at a cost of lower wages, but rather the opposite – higher wages. Hence, 
while small firms generate employment at a cost of lower wages in the model of the managed 
economy, in the entrepreneurial economy model small firms may create both more jobs and higher 
wages.16 
                                                          
14 An anonymous referee pointed out that, clearly, the  trade-off between involuntary unemployment and wages requires 
a ceteris paribus condition: if the productivity of workers increases than both employment and wages can increase.  
15 Carree and Thurik (1999) show that a higher share of small business in European manufacturing industries leads to 
higher growth of value added in the subsequent years. 
16 See Acs, Fitzroy and Smith (2002) and Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo (2002) for illustrating data material. 
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External environment 
The second group of characteristics contrasts the external environment characteristics of the 
models of the managed and the entrepreneurial economies. Turbulence, diversity and heterogeneity 
are central to the model of the entrepreneurial economy. By contrast, stability, specialization and 
homogeneity are the cornerstones in the model of the managed economy. 
Stability in the model of the managed economy results from a homogeneous product 
demand, resulting in a low turnover rate of jobs, workers and firms. The model of the 
entrepreneurial economy is characterized by a high degree of turbulence. Each year many new 
firms are started and only a subset of these firms survives. Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that the 
role of diversity and selection is at the heart of generating change. This holds for both the managed 
and the entrepreneurial economy model. However, what differs in these models is the management 
and organization of the process by which diversity is created as well as the selection mechanism. In 
the model of the managed economy research activities are organized and scheduled in departments 
devoted to developing novel products and services. The management of change fits into what 
Nelson and Winter (1982) refer to as the firm’s routines. The ability of existing businesses to 
manage the process of change pre-empted most opportunities for entrepreneurs to start new firms, 
resulting in a low startup rate and a stable industrial structure. In the model of the entrepreneurial 
economy the process of generating new ideas, both within and outside of R&D laboratories, creates 
a turbulent environment with many opportunities for entrepreneurs to start new firms based upon 
different and changing opinions about different and changing ideas. 
A series of theoretical arguments has suggested that the degree of diversity versus 
specialization may account for differences in rates of growth and technological development. While 
specialization of industry activities is associated with lower transaction costs and, therefore, greater 
(static) efficiency, diversity of activities is said to facilitate the exchange of new ideas and, 
therefore, greater innovative activity and (dynamic) efficiency. Because knowledge spillovers are 
an important source of innovative activity, diversity is a prerequisite in the model of the 
entrepreneurial economy where lower transaction costs are preferably sacrificed for greater 
opportunities for knowledge spillover. In the model of the managed economy, there are less gains 
from knowledge spillovers. The higher transaction costs associated with diversity yield little room 
for opportunities in terms of increased innovative activity, making specialization preferable in the 
model of the managed economy.  
Whereas the trade-off between diversity and specialization focuses on firms, that between 
homogeneity and heterogeneity focuses on individuals. There are two dimensions shaping the 
degree of homogeneity versus heterogeneity. The first dimension refers to the genetic make-up of 
individuals and their personal experiences (Nooteboom, 1994) and the second dimension refers to 
the information set to which individuals are exposed. The model of the managed economy is based 
on homogeneity, that of the entrepreneurial economy on heterogeneity. In a heterogeneous 
population communication across individuals tends to be more difficult and costly than in a 
homogenous population: transaction costs are higher and efficiency is lower. At the same time, new 
ideas are more likely to emerge from communication in a heterogeneous than in a homogeneous 
world. Although the likelihood of communication is lower in a heterogeneous population, 
communication is this environment is more prone to produce novelty and innovation. The lower 
transaction costs resulting from a homogeneous population in the model of the managed economy 
are not associated with high opportunity costs because knowledge spillovers are relatively 
unimportant in generating innovative activity. However, knowledge spillovers are a driving force in 
the model of the entrepreneurial economy, offsetting the higher transaction costs associated with a 
heterogeneous population.  
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How firms function 
The third group of characteristics contrasts firm behavior of the models of the managed and 
the entrepreneurial economy: control versus motivation; firm transaction versus market exchange; 
competition and cooperation as substitutes versus complements; and scale versus flexibility.  
Under the model of the managed economy labor is considered as indistinguishable from the 
other input factors, as long as management is able to extract a full day’s worth of energy for a full 
day’s pay (Wheelwright, 1985). It is considered homogeneous and easily replaceable. In the 
managed economy model firms organize their labor according to the principles of command and 
control. Management styles emphasize the maintenance of tasks through direct forms of employee 
control. Under the model of the entrepreneurial economy, the command and control approach to 
labor is less effective as the comparative advantage of the advanced industrialized countries tends to 
be based on new knowledge. Motivating workers to facilitate the discovery process and 
implementation of new ideas is more important than requiring an established set of activities from 
knowledge workers. Management styles emphasize the nurturing of interpersonal relationships 
facilitating rather than supervising employees. In the entrepreneurial economy model the focus of 
activities is on exploring new abilities, rather than exploiting existing ones. Hence, under the model 
of the entrepreneurial economy motivating employees to participate in the creation and 
commercialization of new ideas is more important than simply controlling and regulating their 
behavior. The distinction between controlling and motivating employees can be traced back to, and 
corresponds with, McGregor’s (1960) Theory X and Y, autocratic versus democratic decision-
making (Lewin and Lippitt, 1938), task-oriented versus interpersonal oriented styles (Blake and 
Mouton, 1964), and transactional versus transformational leadership (Bass et al., 1996).17 It has also 
been suggested that controlling versus motivating employees can be viewed as more masculine 
versus more feminine management styles (Van Engen, 2001), although a recent study by Verheul 
(2003) suggests that women are more control-oriented than men when managing employees. 
Dating back to Coase (1937), and more recently to Williamson (1975), an analytical 
distinction can be made between exchange via the market and intra-firm transactions. Both Coase 
and Williamson emphasize that uncertainty and imperfect information increase the cost of intra-firm 
transactions. As Knight (1921) argued, low uncertainty combined with transparency and 
predictability of information, make intra-firm transactions efficient relative to market exchange. In 
the managed economy model, where there is a high degree of certainty and predictability of 
information, transactions within firms tend to be more efficient than market exchange. By contrast, 
in the entrepreneurial economy model market transactions are more efficient because of the high 
uncertainty. Since the mid-1970s the economic arena has become increasingly uncertain and 
unpredictable (Carlsson, 1989; Carlsson and Taymaz, 1994), witnessed by a decrease in both mean 
firm size and the extent of vertical integration and conglomeration.  
While models of competition generally assume that firms behave autonomously, models of 
cooperation assume linkages among firms. These linkages take various forms, including joint 
ventures, strategic alliances, and (in)formal networks (Gomes-Casseres, 1996 and 1997; 
Nooteboom, 1999). In the model of the managed economy competition and cooperation are viewed 
as being substitutes. Firms are vertically integrated and primarily compete in product markets. 
Cooperation between firms in the product market reduces the number of competitors and reduces 
the degree of competition. In the model of the entrepreneurial economy firms are vertically 
independent and specialized in the product market. The higher degree of vertical disintegration 
under the model of the entrepreneurial economy implies a replacement of internal transactions 
within a large vertically integrated corporation with cooperation among independent firms. At the 
same time, there are more firms, resulting in an increase in both the competitive and cooperative 
                                                          
17 An anonymous referee refers to Ackroyd and Thomson (1999) for some entertaining examples on the subject within 
UK firms.  
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interface. The likelihood of a firm competing or cooperating with other firms is higher in the 
entrepreneurial economy model.  
Under the model of the managed economy costs-per-unit are reduced through expanding the 
scale of output, or through exploiting economies of scale. In product lines and industries where a 
large scale of production translates into a substantial reduction in average costs, large firms will 
have an economic advantage, leading to a concentrated industrial structure. The importance of scale 
economies has certainly contributed to the emergence and dominance of large corporations in heavy 
manufacturing industries, such as steel, automobiles, and aluminum (Chandler, 1977). The 
alternative source of reduced average costs is flexibility (Teece, 1993), characterizing the 
entrepreneurial economy model. Industries where demand for particular products is shifting 
constantly, require a flexible system of production that can meet such a whimsical demand.  
Government policy 
The final group of contrasting dimensions of the models of the entrepreneurial economy and 
the managed economy refers to government policy, including the goals of policy (enabling versus 
constraining), the target of policy (inputs versus outputs), the locus of policy (local versus national) 
and financing policy (entrepreneurial versus incumbent).  
Under the model of the managed economy public policy towards the firm is essentially 
constraining in nature. There are three general types of public policy towards business: antitrust 
policy (competition policy), regulation, and public ownership. All three of these policy approaches 
restrict the firm’s freedom to contract. Under the model of the managed economy the relevant 
policy question is How can the government withhold firms from abusing their market power? The 
entrepreneurial economy model is characterized by a different policy question: How can 
governments create an environment fostering the success and viability of firms? Whereas the major 
issues in the model of the managed economy are concerns about excess profits and abuses of market 
dominance, in the model of the entrepreneurial economy the issues of international competitiveness, 
growth and employment are important. In the managed economy model the emphasis is 
constraining market power through regulation, whereas the focus in the entrepreneurial economy 
model is on stimulating firm development and performance through enabling policies.18 
Another governmental policy dimension involves targeting selected outputs in the 
production process versus targeting selected inputs. Because of the relative certainty regarding 
markets and products in the model of the managed economy, the appropriate policy response is to 
target outcomes and outputs. Specific industries and firms can be promoted through government 
programs. Whereas in the model of the managed economy production is based on the traditional 
inputs of land, labor and capital, in the entrepreneurial economy model it is mainly based on 
knowledge input. There is uncertainty about what products should be produced, how and by whom. 
This high degree of uncertainty makes it difficult to select appropriate outcomes and increases the 
likelihood of targeting the wrong firms and industries. Hence, the appropriate policy in the model of 
the entrepreneurial economy is to target inputs, and in particular those inputs related to the creation 
and commercialization of knowledge. 
The locus of policy is a third dimension on which the models of the managed and 
entrepreneurial economy can be compared. Under the model of the managed economy the 
appropriate locus of policy making is the national or federal level. While the targeted recipients of 
policy may be localized in one or a few regions, the most important policy making institutions tend 
to be located at the national level. By contrast, under the model of the entrepreneurial economy, 
government policy towards business tends to be decentralized and regional or local in nature. This 
                                                          
18 As an anonymous referee pointed out: enabling one section in society may entail constraining other sections. For 
instance, a major policy issue for small businesses in the UK is how government can withhold banks from abusing 
power in the market from small business banking, thereby fostering an environment in which small businesses can 
succeed. 
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distinction in the locus of policy results from two factors. First, because the competitive source of 
economic activity in the model of the entrepreneurial economy is knowledge, which tends to be 
localized in regional clusters, public policy requires an understanding of regional-specific 
characteristics and idiosyncrasies. Secondly, the motivation underlying government policy in the 
entrepreneurial economy is growth and the creation of jobs (with high pay), to be achieved mainly 
through new venture creation. New firms are usually small and pose no oligopolistic threat in 
national or international markets. In the model of the entrepreneurial economy no external costs – in 
the form of higher prices – are imposed on consumers in the national economy as is the case in the 
model of the managed economy. The promotion of local economies imposes no cost on consumers 
in the national economy. Hence, local intervention is justified and does not result in any particular 
loss incurred by agents outside of the region. 
Finally, financing policies vary between the two models. Under the model of the managed 
economy, the systems of finance provide the existing companies with just liquidity for investment.19 
Liquidity is seen as a homogeneous input factor. The model of the entrepreneurial economy 
requires a system of finance that is different from that in the model of the managed economy. In the 
model of the managed economy there is certainty in outputs as well as inputs. There is a strong 
connection between banks and firms, fostering growth. In the entrepreneurial economy model 
certainty has given way to uncertainty requiring different (or differently structured) financial 
institutions. In particular the venture and informal capital markets, providing finance for high-risk 
and innovative new firms (Gaston, 1989; Gompers, 1999), play an important role in the model of 
the entrepreneurial economy. In this model liquidity looses its homogeneous image and is often 
coupled with forms of advice, knowledge and changing levels of involvement.  
Storey (2003) has painstakingly documented examples of policies predicted by the 
entrepreneurial model like access to loan finance and equity capital, access to markets, 
administrative burdens, managed workspace, university spin-offs, science parks, stimulating 
innovation and R&D and training in small firms. See Storey (2003, table 3). 
Discussion 
The model of the managed economy seems to characterize most economies throughout the 
first three-quarters of the previous century. It is based on relative certainty in outputs (mainly 
manufactured products) and inputs (mainly land, labor and capital). The twin forces of globalization 
have reduced the ability of the managed economies of Western Europe and North America to grow 
and create jobs. On the one hand there is the advent of new competition from low-cost, but 
relatively high educated and skill-intensive, countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Asia. 
On the other hand, the telecommunications and computer revolutions have drastically reduced the 
cost of shifting not just capital but also information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into 
lower-cost locations around the globe. Taken together, these twin forces of globalization imply that 
economic activity in high-cost locations is no longer compatible with routinized tasks. Rather, 
globalization has shifted the comparative advantage of high-cost locations to knowledge-based 
activities, and in particular intellectual search activities. These activities cannot be costlessly 
transferred around the globe. Knowledge as an input into economic activity is inherently different 
from land, labor and capital. It is characterized by high uncertainty, high asymmetries across people 
and high transaction costs. An economy where knowledge is the main source of comparative 
advantage is more consistent with the model of the entrepreneurial economy.  
This paper has identified fourteen dimensions that span the difference between the models of 
the entrepreneurial and managed economies and provides a framework for understanding how the 
entrepreneurial economy fundamentally differs from the managed economy. See Table 1 for a 
overview. Building upon Audretsch and Thurik (2001) these contrasting models provide a lens 
                                                          
19 See Hughes and Storey (1994), Storey (1994), Reid (1996) and the special issue of Small Business Economics 
devoted to European SME Financing (Cressy and Olofsson, 1997). 
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through which economic events can be interpreted and policy formulated. Using the wrong lens 
leads to the wrong policy choice. For example, under the model of the managed economy firm 
failure is viewed negatively, representing a drain on society’s resources. In the model of the 
managed economy resources are not invested in high-risk ventures. In the model of the 
entrepreneurial economy firm failure is viewed differently, i.e., as an experiment, an attempt to go 
in a new direction in an inherently risky environment (Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). An externality 
of failure is learning. In the model of the entrepreneurial economy the process of searching for new 
ideas is accompanied by failure. Similarly, the virtues of long-term relationships, stability and 
continuity under the model of the managed economy give way to flexibility, change, and turbulence 
in the model of the entrepreneurial economy. What is a liability in the model of the managed 
economy is, in some cases, a virtue in the model of the entrepreneurial economy. 
Table 1 Fourteen dimensions of the difference between the model of the 
entrepreneurial and the managed economy 
Category Entrepreneurial economy Managed economy
Underlying forces 
 Localization Globalization 
 Change Continuity 
 Jobs and high wages Jobs or high wages 
External environment 
 Turbulence Stability 
 Diversity Specialization 
 Heterogeneity Homogeneity 
How firms function 
 Motivation Control 
 Market exchange Firm transaction 
 Competition and cooperation Competition or cooperation 
 Flexibility Scale 
Government policy 
 Enabling Constraining 
 Input targeting Output targeting 
 Local locus National locus 
 Entrepreneurial Incumbent 
 
The implication for teaching entrepreneurship is that the role of and context for new and 
small firms is strikingly different in the entrepreneurial economy than in the managed economy. 
While small business was a follower in the managed economy, it has emerged as the engine of 
growth in the entrepreneurial economy. Also, ever more teaching efforts have the small-scaled 
environment as case example regardless of whether the education aims at training people for small 
or large firms. 
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